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Abstract—Machine learning based solutions have been suc-
cessfully employed for automatic detection of malware in Android
applications. However, as is known, machine learning models
lack robustness to adversarial examples, which are crafted by
adding minor, yet carefully chosen, perturbations to the normal
inputs. So far, the adversarial examples can only deceive Android
malware detectors that rely on syntactic features (e.g., requested
permissions, specific API calls, etc.), and the perturbations can
only be implemented by simply modifying Android manifest.
While recent Android malware detectors rely more on semantic
features from Dalvik bytecode rather than manifest, existing
attacking/defending methods are no longer effective due to the
rising challenge in adding perturbations to Dalvik bytecode
without affecting their original functionality.
In this paper, we introduce a new highly-effective attack that
generates adversarial examples of Android malware and evades
being detected by the current models. To this end, we propose
a method of applying optimal perturbations onto Android APK
using a substitute model (i.e., a Deep Neural Network). Based on
the transferability concept, the perturbations that successfully
deceive the substitute model are likely to deceive the original
models as well (e.g., Support Vector Machine in Drebin or
Random Forest in MaMaDroid). We develop an automated tool
to generate the adversarial examples without human interven-
tion to apply the attacks. In contrast to existing works, the
adversarial examples crafted by our method can also deceive
recent machine learning based detectors that rely on semantic
features such as control-flow-graph. The perturbations can also
be implemented directly onto APK’s Dalvik bytecode rather than
Android manifest to evade from recent detectors. We evaluated
the proposed manipulation methods for adversarial examples
by using the same datasets that Drebin and MaMadroid (5879
malware examples) used. Our results show that, the malware
detection rates decreased from 96% to 1% in MaMaDroid, and
from 97% to 1% in Drebin, with just a small distortion generated
by our adversarial examples manipulation method.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growth of mobile applications and their users,
security has increasingly become a great concern for various
stakeholders. According to McAfee’s report [30], the number
of mobile malware samples has increased to 22 millions
in third quarter of 2017. Symantec further reported that in
Android platform, one in every five mobile applications is
actually malware [43]. Hence, it is not surprising that the
demand for automated tools for detecting and analysing mobile
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malware has also risen. Most of the researchers and practi-
tioners in this area target Android platform, which dominants
the mobile OS market. To date, there has been a growing
body of research in malware detection for Android. Among all
the proposed methods [16], machine learning based solutions
have been increasingly adopted by anti-malware companies
[32] due to their anti-obfuscation nature and their capability
of detecting malware variants as well as zero-day samples.
Despite the benefits of machine learning based detectors, it has
been revealed that such detectors are vulnerable to adversarial
examples [34], [8]. Such adversarial examples are crafted
by adding carefully designed perturbations to the legitimate
inputs, that force machine learning models to output false
predictions [19], [33], [41].
Analogously, adversarial examples for machine learning
based detection are very much like the HIV which progres-
sively disables human beings’ immune system. We chose mal-
ware detection over Android platform to assess the feasibility
of using adversarial examples as a core security problem. In
contrast to the same issue in other areas such as image classifi-
cation, the span of acceptable perturbations is greatly reduced:
an image is represented by pixel values in the feature space
and the adversary can modify the feature vector arbitrarily,
as long as the modified image is visually indistinguishable
[50]; however, in the context of crafting adversarial examples
for Android malware, a successful case must comply with the
following restrictions which are much more challenging than
the image classification problem: 1) the perturbation must not
jeopardise malware’s original functions, and 2) the perturbation
to the feature space can be practically implemented in the
Android PacKage (APK), meaning that the perturbation can
be realised in the program code of an unpacked malware and
can also be packed/built into an APK.
So far, there are already a few attempts on crafting/de-
fending adversarial examples against machine learning based
malware detection for Android platform. However, the va-
lidity of these works is usually questionable due to their
impracticality. For example, Chen et al. [10] proposed to
inject crafted adversarial examples into the training dataset so
as to reduce detection accuracy. This method is impractical
because it is not easy for attackers to gain access to the
training dataset in most use cases. Grosse et al. [20] explored
the feasibility of crafting adversarial examples in Android
platform, but their malware detecting classifier was limited to
Deep Neural Network (DNN) only. They could not guarantee
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Fig. 1. File structure of APK. AndroidManifest.xml declares
the essential information; classes.dex contains the Dalvik Bytecode;
resources.arsc holds the compiled resources in binary format; META-
INF, lib, assets, and res folders include the meta data, libraries, assets, and
resources of the application, respectively.
the success of adversarial examples against traditional machine
learning detectors such as Random Forest (RF) and Support
Vector Machine (SVM). Demontis et al. [11] proposed a
theoretically-sound learning algorithm to train linear classifiers
with more evenly-distributed feature weights. This allows one
to improve system security without significantly affecting
computational efficiency. Chen et al. [9] also developed an
ensemble learning method against adversarial examples. Yang
et al. [49] conducted new malware variants for malware detec-
tors to test and strengthen their detection signatures/models.
According to our research, all these ideas [11], [9], [49]
can only be applied to the malware detectors that adopt
syntactic features (e.g., permissions requested in the manifest
or specific APIs in the source code [44], [1], [3], [36]).
However, almost all recent machine learning based detection
methods rely more on the semantic features collected from
Dalvik bytecode (i.e., classes.dex). This disables existing
methods of crafting/defending adversarial examples in Android
platform. Moreover, it is usually simple for existing methods
to modify AndroidManifest.xml for the generation of
adversarial examples. However, when the features are collected
from classes.dex, it becomes very challenging to modify the
classes.dex file without changing the original functionality due
to their programmatic complexity. Therefore, existing works
are not of much value in providing proactive solutions to
the ever-evolving adversarial examples in terms of Android
malware variants. [9], [20], [10], [11], [49].
In this paper, we propose and study a highly-effective
attack that generates adversarial malware examples in Android
platform, which can evade being detected by current machine
learning based detectors. In the real world, defenders and at-
tackers are always engaged in a never-ending war. To increase
the robustness of Android malware detectors against malware
variants, we need to be proactive and take potential adversarial
scenarios into account while designing malware detectors to
achieve creating such a proactive design. The work in this
paper envisions an advanced method to craft Android malware
adversarial examples. The results can be used for Android
malware detectors to identify malware variants with the manip-
ulated features. For the convenience of description, we selected
two typical Android malware detectors, MaMaDroid [29] and
Drebin [1]. Each of these two selects semantic or syntactic
features to model malware behaviours.
We summarise the key contributions of this paper from
different angles of view as follows:
• Technically, we propose an innovative method of craft-
ing adversarial examples on recent machine learning
based detectors for Android malware (e.g., Drebin
and MaMaDroid). They mainly collected features (ei-
ther syntactic or semantic ones) from Dalvik bytecode
to capture behaviors of Android malware. This contri-
bution is distinguishable from the existing works [9],
[20], [10], [11], [49] because can only target/protect
the detectors relying on syntactic features.
• Practically, we designed an automated tool to apply the
method to the real-world malware samples. The tool
calculates the perturbations, modifies source files, and
rebuilds the modified APK. This is a key contribution
as the developed tool adds the perturbations directly
to APK’s classes.dex. This is in contrast to the
existing works (e.g., [9], [11]) that simply apply per-
turbations in AndroidManifest.xml. Although it
is easy to implement, they cannot target/protect recent
Android malware detectors (e.g., [12], [38]) which do
not extract features from Manifest.
• We evaluated the proposed manipulation methods of
adversarial examples by using the same datasets that
Drebin and MaMaDroid (5879 malware samples) used
[1], [42]. Our results show that, the malware detection
rates decreased from 96% to 1% in MaMaDroid, and
from 97% to 1% in Drebin, with just a small distortion
generated by our adversarial example manipulation
method.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
gives an introduction to Android application packaging which
forms the basis for adding perturbations. Section III presents
the details of two typical targeted Android malware detectors
as well as the attack scenarios. Section IV and V show how
to craft adversarial examples against MamaDroid and Drebin,
respectively, followed by discussions on open issues in Section
VI. Related work comes in Section VII, and finally, Section
VIII concludes the paper.
II. ANDROID APPLICATION PACKAGE
Android applications are packaged and distributed in the
form of APK files. The APK file is a jar-like archive that
packs the application’s dexcode (.dex files), resources, assets,
and manifest file. The structure of an APK is shown in
Fig.1. In particular, AndroidManifest.xml is designed
for the meta-data such as permissions requested, definitions of
components like Activities, Services, Broadcast Receivers and
Content Providers. Classes.dex is used to store the Dalvik
bytecode to be executed on the Android Runtime environment.
Res folder contains graphics, string resources, user interface
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layouts, etc. Assets folder includes non-compiled files and
METAINF is to store the signatures and certificates.
The state-of-the-art detectors usually use machine learning
based classifiers to categorise suspicious applications to be
either malicious or benign ones [1], [29], [36], [3], [44].
Features employed by such classifiers are extracted from the
APK archive by performing static analysis on the manifest
and dexcode files. Manifest introduces the components of an
application, as well as its requested permissions, activities,
services, broadcast receivers, and hardware features, etc. Such
information is presented in a binary XML format inside
AndroidManifest.xml.
Contents presented in the manifest are informative, im-
plying the intentions and behaviours of an application. For
instance, requesting android.permission.SEND_SMS
and android.permission.READ_CONTACTS permis-
sions indicate that the application may send text messages to
your contacts. Features retrieved from the manifest are usually
constructed as a group of binary value vectors, each of which
indicates the presence of a certain element in the manifest.
Dexcode, or Dalvik Bytecode, is the operational code on
Android platform. All the Java source codes are compiled and
assembled into a single Dalvik Executable (classes.dex).
Features extracted from classes.dex, such as CFG and
DDG, contains rich semantic information and logical structure
of the application. Such features are proved to have strong
discriminating power for identification of malwares. Features
extracted from the dexcode are presented in two forms: 1) the
raw sequence of API calls, and 2) the statistic information
retrieved from the call graph (e.g., similarity scores between
two graphs [12]).
To evade being detected by machine learning based so-
lutions, a malware sample has to be manipulated so that
the extracted features for the learning systems look benign.
Intuitively, the target files to be modified are those from which
the features are extracted, i.e., AndroidManifest.xml
and/or classes.dex. While both of these files are in binary
format and are not readable by human, decompiling tools such
as apktool are used to convert them into a readable format.
Specifically, the binary XML can be transformed into plain-text
XML, and the Dalvik bytecode can be disassembled to smali
files, which are more human-friendly as intermediate presenta-
tions of bytecode. The processed AndroidManifest.xml
and smali files can be edited and reassembled to an APK.
III. TARGETED SYSTEMS AND ATTACK SCENARIOS
We propose a framework to craft adversarial examples
that can evade machine learning based detection. We target
two typical solutions which have been widely analysed in
this field, i.e., MaMaDroid [29] and Drebin [1]. The se-
mantic features that MaMaDroid uses are extracted from
classes.dex, and the syntactic string values which are adopted
by Drebin are retrieved from both AndroidManifest.xml
and classes.dex. We provide an overview of MaMaDroid
and Drebin below.
A. MaMaDroid
MaMaDroid extracts features from the CFG of an applica-
tion. It uses the sequence of abstracted API calls rather than
the frequency or presence of certain APIs, aiming at capturing
the behavioural model of the mobile application. MaMaDroid
operates in two modes, namely family mode and package
mode. API calls will be abstracted to either family level or
package level according to their mode. For instance, the API
call sendTextMessage() is abstracted as:
family︷ ︸︸ ︷
android .telephony︸ ︷︷ ︸
package
.SmsManager : void sendTextMessage()
︸ ︷︷ ︸
API call
Family mode is more lightweight, while package mode is more
fine-grained. We demonstrate the results of attacking both.
MaMaDroid firstly extracts the CFG from each application,
and obtains the sequences of API calls. Then, the API calls
are abstracted using either of the above-mentioned modes.
Finally, MaMaDroid constructs a Markov chain, with the
transition probabilities between each family or package, used
as the feature vector to train a machine learning classifier.
Fig. 2 illustrates the feature extraction process in MaMaDroid.
Sub-graph (a) is a code snippet that has been decompiled
from a malicious application; sub-graph (b) shows the call
graph extracted from the source code; sub-graph (c) is the
abstracted call graph generated from (b); and finally, sub-graph
(d) presents the Markov chain generated based on (c).
MaMaDroid recognises nine families and 338 pack-
ages from official Android documentation. Packages, which
are defined by application developer and obfuscated with
identifier mangling, are abstracted as self-defined and
obfuscated, respectively. Overall, there are 340 possible
packages and 11 families.
Given the extracted features, MaMaDroid leverages RF,
KNN, and SVM to train the malware detector and test the
performance on several datasets (which were collected over
different time periods). RF outperforms the other two classi-
fiers, with its F-measure reaching 0.98 and 0.99 in the family
and package modes, respectively.
B. Drebin
Drebin is an on-device lightweight Android malware
detector. Drebin extracts features from both the manifest
and the disassembled dexcode through a linear sweep over
AndroidManifest.xml and the disassembled smali files
of the application. The features such as permissions, activities,
and API calls are presented as strings. Eight sets of features
are retrieved, as listed in Table I.
TABLE I. OVERVIEW OF DREBIN FEATURE SET
Drebin feature sets
manifest
S1 Hardware components
S2 Requested permissions
S3 App components
S4 Filtered intents
dexcode
S5 Restricted API calls
S6 Used permissions
S7 Suspicious API calls
S8 Network addresses
The extracted features are put into a multidimensional
vector (S) to create a |S|-D space, in which we can have 0
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package com.a.c;
import android.util.Log;
Import android.content.Context;
import y2k.joyreactor.ServiceLocator; 
import y2k.joyreactor.util.Record; 
public class FetchAd {
  public static boolean Fetch(Context para){
    try {
      ServiceLocator.getService(true).record(para);
      return true;}
    catch (Exception para) {
      Log.d("u tty", para.getMessage()); }
    return false;
  }}
com.a.c FetchAd:
Fetch()
android.util.Log:
d()y2k.joyreactor.ServiceLocator:
getService()
y2k.joyreactor.util.Record:
record()
java.lang.Throwable:
getMessage()
(a) source code
self‐defined
java android java.lang android.util
self‐defined
0.5
0.25 0.25
0.5
0.25 0.25
com.a.c FetchAd:
Fetch()
[self‐defined, self‐defined]
Java.lang.Throwable:
getMessage()
[java, java.lang]
android.util.Log:
d()
[android, android.util]
com.a.c FetchAd:
Fetch()
[self‐defined, self‐defined]
com.a.c FetchAd:
Fetch()
[self‐defined, self‐defined]
y2k.joyreactor.ServiceLocator:
getService()
[self‐defined, self‐defined]
y2k.joyreactor.ServiceLocator:
getService()
[self‐defined, self‐defined]
(b) call graph generated from (a)
(c) call sequence extracted from (b), with corresponding family/package abstraction in sqaure brackets (d) Markov chains generated from (c), in family and package mode.
family package
Fig. 2. Process of feature extraction in MaMaDroid, from (a) to (d)
or 1 value along each dimension, indicating the presence or
absence of the corresponding feature. The following shows an
example of the feature vector ϕ(x) of a malicious application
that sends premium SMS messages and thus requests certain
permissions and hardware components.
ϕ(x) 7→

...
0
1
...
1
0
...

...
permission.SEND_SMS
permission.RECORD_AUDIO
...
hardware.camera
hardware.telephony
...
After the features being retrieved, Drebin learns a linear SVM
classfier to discriminate between benign and malicious applica-
tions. The classification performance on Drebin was evaluated
on a dataset consisting 5,560 malware samples and 123,453
benign applications, which are collected between August 2010
and October 2012. The recall on malware class has 94% with
a false-positive rate of 1%.
C. Attack Scenarios
The knowledge of the target system obtained by the adver-
sary may vary in different situations. This includes the feature
set, the training set, the classification algorithm as well as the
parameters. We argue that in the real world, it is not likely
for the adversary to have full knowledge of the classification
algorithm used in the target detector. However, the adversary
can probe the detector through feeding desired inputs and
getting the corresponding outputs.
In this paper, we consider the following four situations in
our attack: 1) Scenario F: the adversary only knows the feature
set; 2) Scenario FT: The adversary knows both the feature
set and training set, but does not have the black-box access
to the target detector; 3) Scenario FB: The adversary knows
the feature set only, and has access to the target system as a
black box; and 4) Scenario FTB: The adversary knows both
the feature set and the training set, and also has access to
the target system as a black box. Knowing the feature set, as
a base assumption for attacking learning systems, has been
widely adopted in similar works in this field [25], [6]. Note
that in the FTB and FT scenarios, the adversary can only have
the feature set, but he/she cannot inject new samples or modify
the existing ones in the training set.
IV. ATTACK ON MAMADROID
A. Attack Algorithm
We introduce an evasion attack on MaMaDroid in this
section. The purpose is to make a piece of malware evasive
with minimal API call injections into its original smali code.
We assume that we only have black-box access to the target
(MaMaDroid) detector. In other words, we can get output
from MaMaDroid by feeding input, but we do not know how
it processes internally. There are two considerations for the
features used in MaMaDroid. First, because the features are
actually the state transition probabilities of the call graph, the
probabilities of the transitions departing from the same node
in the call graph will increment up to 1. Second, the feature
value should be bounded between 0 and 1. We will address
these considerations in our algorithms.
We employ two adversarial example crafting algorithms
that have been widely adopted to generate evasive malware
examples. To study a more effective way of attacking, we
craft adversarial example by either optimising an adversarial
objective function (i.e., refer as C&W ), or perturbing influen-
tial features based on the indicative forward derivatives (i.e.,
refer as JSMA). C&W and JSMA are originally developed
for crafting image example, which has continuous pixel values
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as the features. In our case, we are going to calculate the
perturbation based on the number of API calls, which are
discrete. Therefore, we need to modify plain C&W and JSMA
to cater our needs. We construct a neural network F as a
substitute to launch the attack. In the malware detection case,
F is a binary classifier which has a 2D output. Let the input
features of the original malware form an n dimensional vector
like X .
1) Modified C&W: C&W crafts adversarial malware with
tunable attack confidence while optimising the distortion on
the original malwale features. We modify C&W to search for
an adversarial malware sample through optimising an objective
function with the following constraints:
minδ ||δ||22 + c · f(X + δ)
s.t. X + δ ∈ [0, 1]n,
and ||Xg + δg||1 = 1, g ∈ 1...k.
(1)
Here, δ is the perturbation to be optimised and c is a constant
to balance the two terms in the objective function. We use
line-search to determine the value of c. The first term in the
objective function minimises the l2 distortion on the original
features, which means the change on the MaMaDroid feature
should be small enough to limit the amount of code we insert
into the Smali code. The second term is a specially designed
adversarial loss function f . Suppose t is the ground-truth class
of the current malware example X . Our goal is to make X be
incorrectly classified into the other classes (in our case, the
benign class). Thus, f takes the following format:
f(X) = max(Z(X)t −max{Z(X)i : i 6= t},−κ) (2)
in which Z(X) is the pre-softmax output from the sub-
stitute F , κ is a hyper-parameter which can adjust the attack
confidence and f will maximise the loss between the current
model output and the correct output. In the case of MaMadroid,
the features used in malware detection are the transition proba-
bilities. Therefore, we have two constraints in the optimisation.
First, each feature after perturbation should be between 0 and
1. Second, the features can be divided into k groups where
each group (like g) contains the features belonging to the same
Android family. Therefore, the l1 norm of the features in each
group should be equal to 1. The objective function is optimised
using AdaGrad [13]. The feature values are iteratively updated
until the sample is misclassified. We use either the substitute
model (in scenario F and FT), or the MaMaDroid oracle (in
scenario FB and FTB), which we refer as the pilot classifier,
to determine whether an example is misclassified.
Since the current feature X is a set of probabilities, to
make the perturbation viable during the code injection into the
original smali code, we change the optimisation variable from
δi on X (the perturbation on the probabilities) to ω on A (the
perturbation on the number of API calls). For the perturbation
on the i-th feature in group g, we have:
δgi =
agi + ω
g
i
ag + ωg
− a
g
i
ag
. (3)
Algorithm 1 C&W based Attack Method
F is the substitute, X is the input example, t is the ground
truth label, X∗ is the corresponding adversarial example, a
is the vector of the API call numbers for each API call, ω is
the change made to API calls, Y is the output label from the
substitute given an input example, c is a constant balancing the
distortion and the adversarial loss, C is the upper bound of c
in line-search, κ is a hyper-parameter controlling the strength
of attack. γ is the number of the maximal allowed gradient
update iteration, and α is the step length in gradient descent.
Input: F , X , a, γ, t, κ, c, C, α.
1: X∗ ←X
2: max iter ← γ
3: Objectiveadv ← ‖ω‖22 + c · f(a
g
i
+ωg
i
ag+ωg | F ,κ)
4: while c < C & Y = t do
5: while iter < max iter do
6: Compute gradients ∇ωObjectiveadv(X∗)
7: ω ← ω + clip(α · ∇ωObjectiveadv(X∗))
8: X∗ ←X∗g = a
g
i
+ωg
i
ag+ωg
9: iter + +
10: end while
11: c← c ∗ 10
12: end while
13: return X∗
wherein ωg =
∑
i ω
g
i and a
g
i is the number of API calls
indicated by the i-th feature in the g-th group. We change
the optimiser from δ to ω. Accordingly, we change the first
term of the adversarial objective function to ||ω||22, in order to
minimise the total number of code injections.
Since we can only inject code to make adversarial exam-
ples, we apply a ReLu function (i.e., ReLu(ω) = max(0, ω))
to clip ω to non-negative values after each iteration. As the
result, the first constraint (i.e., a
g
i
+ωg
i
ag+ωg ∈ [0, 1]) is automatically
satisfied. To satisfy the second constraint (the sum of the
feature values in the same group being 1), we normalise∑
i
ag
i
+ωg
i
ag+ωg for each group after each gradient descent round.
The detailed algorithm is in Algorithm 1.
2) Modified JSMA: JSMA finds adversarial examples
using the forward derivatives of the classifier. JSMA iteratively
perturbs important features to determine the Jacobian matrix
based on the model input and output features. The method
first calculates the Jacobian matrix between the input features
X and the outputs from F . In the case of MaMaDroid, we
want to find the Jacobian between the API call numbers A
and the outputs from F , given the relationship between API
call numbers and the probabilities (i.e., the input features). The
Jacobian can be calculated as follows:
JF (A) = [
∂F (X)
∂X
∂X
∂A
] = [
∂Fj(X)
∂xi
∂xi
∂ai
]i∈1...n,j∈0,1 (4)
wherein i is the index of the input feature and j is the index
of the output classes (in our case it is binary). xi is the i-
th feature, ai is the corresponding i-th API call, and FjX is
the output of the substitute at the j-th class. Suppose t is the
ground truth label. To make an adversarial example, Ft(X)
should decrease while the outputs of other classes Fj(X), j 6=
t are increased.
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Algorithm 2 JSMA based Attack Method
A is the vector of the API call numbers for each API call,N is
the vector of the sums of every API calls group, X is the input
example, X∗ is the corresponding adversarial example, γ is
the number of the maximal allowed iteration, θ is the change
made to API calls, F is the substitute, F ∗ is the adversarial
network, Y ∗ is the adversarial network output
Input: A, N , X , γ, θ ,Y ∗
1: X ← AN
2: X∗ ←X
3: // Search Domain is all features
4: Γ← {1...|X|}
5: max iter ← γ
6: // Groundtruth class
7: t← argmax F ∗(X∗)
8: // Current class
9: c← argmax F ∗(X∗)
10: while c 6= t & iter < max iter & Γ 6= ∅ do
11: Compute forward derivative ∇F (X∗)
12: x1, x2 ← saliency map(∇F (X∗), Γ, Y ∗)
13: Translate X∗ to specific numbers of calls O
14: Modify O at x1 position in X
∗ by adding θ
15: Recalculate X∗ using O
16: Repeat from line 12 to 14 replacing x1 with x2
17: Remove x1 & x2 from Γ
18: c← argmaxF ∗(X∗)
19: iter + +
20: end while
21: return X
Based on the calculated Jacobian, we can construct a
saliency map S(A, t) to direct the perturbation. The value for
feature i in the saliency map can be computed as:
S(A, t)[i] =
{
0, ifJit(A) > 0 or
∑
j 6=t Jij(A) < 0,
|Jit(A)|(
∑
j 6=t Jij(A)), otherwise.
(5)
According to the saliency map, we pick one API call
(i) that has the highest S(A, t)[i] value to perturb during
each iteration. The maximum amount of allowed changes is
restricted to γ. The number of the selected API call will be
increased by a small amount, like θ, in each iteration. The
iteration terminates when the sample is misclassified by the
pilot classifier, or the maximum change number is reached.
The detailed algorithm is introduced in Algorithm 2.
B. APK Manipulation
In our study, the development of the APK file modification
method was guided by the following design goals: 1) the
modified APK will keep its original functionality; and 2) the
modification will not involve additional human efforts, i.e., it
can be applied automatically via running scripts.
As introduced in section III, the feature vector that Ma-
MaDroid uses to classify applications are the transition proba-
bilities between states (either families or packages). Intuitively,
the modification approach we apply is to add a certain number
of API calls from specific callers to callees into the code to
change feature values in the feature space. Since we can obtain
the total number of calls that go from a specific caller to a
specific callee by static analysis, we can calculate how much
the feature values will be affected by adding a single call.
The APK manipulation process is designed with two strate-
gies, namely simple manipulation strategy and sophisticated
manipulation strategy. The following explains their details and
limitations, respectively.
Simple manipulation strategy was motivated by the pro-
cess that MaMaDroid extracts and calculates its feature val-
ues. MaMaDroid extracts all API calls from classes.dex,
and abstracts them as either their families or packages
merely based on their root domain in the package names.
For instance, The self-defined class "MyClass" in a
self-defined package like android.os.mypack, and the
system class "StorageManager" in the system pack-
age android.os.storage, will both be abstracted as
android family or android.os package. By adding such
self-defined classes, we are able to mislead the abstraction of
API calls in MaMaDroid.
According to the above observation, we design some code
blocks that can include an arbitrary number of calls from any
caller to any callee. The java source code shown below is
an example of adding two android to android calls.
Arbitrary number of calls can be added by simply invoking
callee() multiple times in the caller().
package android.os.mypack
public class Myclass {
public static void callee() {}
public static void caller() {
callee();
callee();}}
Our approach proceeds by injecting the required self-
defined classes into the source of the target APK, and invoking
the corresponding caller methods in the onCreate()
method of its entry point activity class (by locating
"android.intent.action.MAIN" in the manifest).
Since source code cannot be perfectly reverse-engineered to
Java, we perform the code insertion on the smali code. As
mentioned in Section II, the modified smali codes can be
rebuilt to make an APK again. The following listing presents
the smali code of the added Java source code (with constructor
methods omitted).
.class public Landroid/os/mypack/Myclass;
.source "Myclass.java"
.method public static callee()V
.locals 0
return-void
.end method
.method public static caller()V
.locals 0
.line 6
invoke-static {},
Landroid/os/mypack/Myclass;->callee()V
return-void
.end method
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The described modification process can add an arbitrary
number of calls from any callers to any callees, by simply
runing an automated script. It also ensures that the process
will not affect the functionality of the original application.
However, it modifies the CFG that MaMaDroid extracted from
the APK, and additionally modifies its feature values.
Simple manipulation takes advantage of the design flaw
in the feature abstraction process in MaMaDroid, thus can
possibly be defended by implementing white-list filter (which
is not implemented in MaMaDroid), the details of this defence
method and how to counter this defence is discussed in Section
VI.
Sophisticated manipulation strategy is designed to
bypass the white-list filter, in which system provided
non-functional API calls are inserted into the smali
code. For instance, invoking a Log.d() method in the
onCreate() method of the entry activity class (e.g.,
com.my.project.MainActivity), will result in adding
one self-defined to android call in the family mode, or one
self-defined to android.util call in the package mode. Since
the calls that we inserted are in the activity class of the
project, it is abstracted to self-defined or obfuscated
according to the abstraction rule of MaMaDroid. Therefore,
with sophisticated manipulation, calls only originated from
self-defined or obfuscated family/package can be inserted.
Such limitation decreased the evasion rate from 99% to 59%
in our experiment. An example of added smali code for a
log.d() method is presented as follows.
const-string p0, ""
const-string p1, ""
.line 13
invoke-static {p0, p1},
Landroid/util/Log;->d(Ljava/lang/String;
Ljava/lang/String;)I
We developed a script to automatically perform the code
insertion process. We firstly prepared the above described
no-op code blocks from each caller to each callee. These
code block are independent to the application, thus can be
repeatedly used in the attack. The number of calls to be
inserted from specific callers to callees were calculated by
our attack algorithms described in Section IV-A. Then, we
used regular expression to locate the onCreate() method
in the smali code of the entry point activity class, and add
any necessary code blocks to the end of the onCreate()
method. Fig. 3 demonstrates the attack process, in which the
dashed lines show the process of our attack algorithm, and the
solid lines illustrate our APK manipulation procedure.
C. Experiment Settings
The experiments to be presented in the following two
subsections evaluate the effectiveness of crafted adversarial
examples. More specifically, we are going to answer the
following two questions: 1) can the modified malware sample
effectively evade from the targeted detector? and 2) can the
modification be easily applied to the original APK? For the
convenience of experiments, we built MaMaDroid based on
the source code that the authors published in their online
repository1.
1) Dataset: To evaluate the performance of the crafted
adversarial examples, we use the same datasets that have been
used in MaMaDroid. First, the set of benign applications con-
sists of 5,879 clean applications collected by PlayDrone [42]
in 2014 (denoted by oldbenign in [29]). The set of malware
includes 5,560 samples that were initially used in Drebin [1]
and collected between 2010 and 2012 (denoted by drebin in
[29]). The original experiments reported in [29] also tested
several combinations of other old and new datasets collected
over years to evaluate the robustness of their approach. Using
only one set of data does not affect our research target, i.e., to
craft adversarial example that can fool and evade the malware
detector. The classification results on the chosen datasets are
promising, of which the F-measures reach 0.88 and 0.96, in the
family and package mode, respectively. Our work is to generate
malware samples for evading the detection, therefore, our test
set obtains only malware samples. We carefully prepare the test
set by manually checking that every sample can be installed
and launched on an Android smart phone. We randomly select
1,000 qualified malware samples to form the test set, leaving
the rest of the malware samples, together with the benign
application samples to be the training set.
As discussed in Section III-C, to simulate the scenarios
where the original training dataset of the targeted detector
is unknown to us (Scenario F and FB), we collected a
set of malware and another set of benign applications from
VirusShare 2 and APKPure 3, respectively. VirusShare dataset
consists of 24,317 malware samples collected between May
2013 to March 2014, while APKPure dataset consists of 10,000
applications we crawled from its website on January 2018.
The applications from APKPure are submitted to VirusTotal
to examine their benignity. We discard the samples that are
reported by at least one anti-virus engine as malicious. Finally,
the APKPure dataset contains 9,664 application. We randomly
selected 4,560 malware samples and 5,879 benign applica-
tions from VirusShare and APKPure datasets, respectively, to
form the surrogat dataset (to eliminate the influence caused
by different number of training samples in the original and
surrogate datasets). In the FT and FTB scenarios, we use the
original dataset to train the target detector, as well as our
attack algorithm; while in the F and FB scenarios, we use
the original dataset to train the target detector and the
surrogate dataset to train the attack algorithm.
2) Experiment Work Flow: Given a malicious APK as the
input, we firstly decompiled it with apktool, and constructed
its feature vector. The attack algorithm then optimised the
perturbations to be added to the feature vector, i.e., the number
of calls added from each caller to callee. Then, corresponding
pre-designed code blocks were inserted into the smali files,
which were then recompiled into a new APK. The manipulated
APK was submitted to MaMaDroid oracle to get the classifica-
tion result. The attack was declared successful if the modified
APK was labelled as benign. This process makes sure that our
attack method not only changes the feature vector, but also
effectively modifies the APK. We additionally verified that all
1https://bitbucket.org/gianluca students/mamadroid code
2https://virusshare.com
3https://apkpure.com
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Fig. 3. The attack process: the dashed lines show the process of our attack algorithm, and the solid lines illustrate our APK manipulation procedure.
the modified APKs can be successfully installed and launched
on an Android smartphone. It was difficult to verify whether
the functionality was affected or not. However, we presume
that since the calls we added were non-functional, they will
not have changed the functionality of original APK.
As we have explained before, we will run experiments in
four deliberate scenarios (refer to Section III-C). The details
of the settings for each scenario are listed in Table II. In the
experiments, we will train a substitute model to approximate
MaMaDroid by using AdaGrad. Accordingly, a multi-layer
perceptron (MLP) model will be employed, and the model
architecture is shown in Table III. Each training batch will
contain 256 samples and the substitute model will be trained
for 100 epochs. In addition, we will introduce dropout to
prevent overfitting problem in the experiments. Note that
MaMaDroid trained with the original dataset will be used
as benchmark for evaluation, and we only require black-box
access to the pilot classifier (refer the definition to Section
IV-A1).
D. Experiment Results
In [29], MaMaDroid’s performance was examined on four
different machine learning classifiers. They are RF, 1-Nearest
TABLE II. ATTACK SCENARIOS
Scenario Pilot Classifier Training Set
F Substitute Surrogate
FT Substitute Original
FB MaMaDroid Surrogate
FTB MaMaDroid Original
TABLE III. SUBSTITUTE ARCHITECTURE
Layer Substitute
Input Feature dimension
Dense 128
Dropout 0.5
Dense 128
Dropout 0.5
Dense 2
Neighbour (1-NN), 3-Nearest Neighbour (3-NN), and SVM.
To be consistent with the experiments in [29], we also evaluate
our proposed method on the four classifiers, respectively.
The effectiveness of the crafted adversarial examples is
evaluated in terms of evasion rate and distortion. Evasion rate
is defined as the ratio of malware samples that are misclassified
as benign, to the total number of malware samples in the
testing set. Average distortion is defined as the number of
API calls added to the smali code for each malware sample.
1) Overall results: The overall results of attack perfor-
mance is presented in Fig. 4-7, where Fig. 4 and Fig. 5
are the results in the family mode using JSMA and C&W,
respectively. Similarly, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 are the results in the
package mode using JSMA and C&W, respectively. In our
experiment, we applied the attack on four machine learning
algorithms (subfigures (a)-(d)) proposed in [29], under four
real world scenarios (x-axes) as discussed in Section III-C.
Simple manipulation strategy is applied in this experiment,
while Sophisticated manipulation strategy is evaluated in Sub-
section (5). The evasion rate before attack is also reported and
acted as a baseline of our attack. The evasion rate as well as
the average distortion for each sample is reported. The results
indicate that the proposed attack methods effectively evaded
MaMaDroid in most of the real world scenarios. For instance,
the evasion rate on RF increased from 4% (before attack) to
56%-99% (after attack) in the family mode, and from 3% to
58%-99% in the package mode, depending on the scenario
and attack algorithm. It is worth to note that in scenario FTB,
where adversary gains most knowledge of MaMaDroid, the
evasion rate (JSMA) reaches 96% in SVM, 89% in RF, 86%
in 3-NN, and 85% in 1-NN, with average distortion added
to each malware samples being 2, 23, 21, 19, for the four
algorithms, respectively. Even when the adversary only knows
the feature set (scenario F), the evasion rates with JSMA reach
75%, 62%, 58%, and 61%, in the above mentioned algorithms,
respectively.
2) Evaluation results by scenarios: An important obser-
vation is the improvement of attack effectiveness with the
increase of adversary’s knowledge of the target system. Table
8
Base F FT FB FTB0
20
40
60
80
100
Av
g.
 D
ist
or
tio
n
Base F FT FB FTB0
20
40
60
80
100
Av
g.
 D
ist
or
tio
n
Base F FT FB FTB0
20
40
60
80
100
Av
g.
 D
ist
or
tio
n
Base F FT FB FTB0
20
40
60
80
100
Av
g.
 D
ist
or
tio
n
Base F FT FB FTB
(a) RF
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ev
as
io
n 
Ra
te
Base F FT FB FTB
(b) SVM
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ev
as
io
n 
Ra
te
Base F FT FB FTB
(c) 1-NN
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ev
as
io
n 
Ra
te
Base F FT FB FTB
(d) 3-NN
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ev
as
io
n 
Ra
te
Fig. 4. The evasion rate and average distortion of adversarial examples generated by JSMA in the family mode
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Fig. 5. The evasion rate and average distortion of adversarial examples generated by C&W in the family mode.
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Fig. 6. The evasion rate and average distortion of adversarial examples generated by JSMA in the package mode.
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Fig. 7. The evasion rate and average distortion of adversarial examples generated by C&W in the package mode.
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TABLE IV. EVASION RATE OF JSMA AND C&W
C&W JSMA
Algorithm Baseline Scenario F Scenario FT Scenario FB Scenario FTB Scenario F Scenario FT Scenario FB Scenario FTB
RF 0.04 0.56 0.58 0.99 0.99 0.62 0.8 0.72 0.89
SVM 0.06 0.1 0.27 0.99 0.99 0.75 0.96 0.76 0.96
1-NN 0.08 0.15 0.18 0.63 0.76 0.61 0.76 0.7 0.85
3-NN 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.64 0.83 0.58 0.78 0.7 0.86
IV lists the evasion rate of utilising JSMA and C&W in the
family mode. While different level of knowledge obtained
by adversary affects the evasion rate in both algorithms, the
impact on each factor is different. In particular, in the scenarios
which black-box access to MaMaDroid oracle is acquired (i.e.,
FB and FTB), the evasion rate of C&W in all four algorithms
are significantly higher than the evasion rate in the scenarios
which black-box access is not granted (i.e., F and FT). In the
meanwhile, the possession of training set (F versus FT, FB
versus FTB) has little impact on the evasion rate. However,
the evasion rate in JSMA are to the contrast. The possession
of training set influenced the evasion rate significantly, while
the access to black-box model is less important.
3) Evaluation results by operation modes: As introduced
in Section III, MaMaDroid runs in either the family mode or
the package mode. Family mode is more lightweight, while
package mode abstracts the API calls to a more fine-grained
level. The original classification performance in the package
mode is slightly better than that in the family mode, with the
original (baseline) evasion rate falls in the range of 1%-6%
on various algorithms (compared with 4%-11% in the family
mode). Our experimental results indicate that the attack is more
effective in the package mode than in the family mode, in terms
of evasion rate. For instance, when attacking using JSMA, the
evasion rate in the package mode with RF reaches 100% in
scenario FTB (Fig. 6(a)), while it is 89% in the family mode in
the same scenario (Fig. 4(a)). However, the average distortion
of the adversarial example in the package mode is significantly
higher than in the family mode. In average, 35 calls need to
be added in each application in the family mode, while this
number increased to 814 in the package mode. The results
disclose that while using more fine-grained features slightly
enhance the classification accuracy, it’s resistance to our attack
is significantly higher than using highly abstracted features
(i.e., family mode), considering that more than 23 times of
number of calls need to be added for a successful evasion.
4) Evaluation results by parameters.: Fig.8(a) presented
the upper bound of API calls added by JSMA for SVM, RF,
1-NN, and 3-NN. It can be found that it requires less API call
insertion for attacking SVM. The possible reason is that the
SVM can be well approximated by the neural network substi-
tute. Therefore, by only inserting a few API calls, a malware
can be misclassified by SVM. Adversarial example for 1-NN,
3-NN, and RF generally requires more API calls. The possible
reason is that the decision boundaries of these algorithm were
not well approximated by the substitute neural network. The
actual API call modifications under different upper bounds are
summarised in Fig.8(b). Optimising an adversarial example for
SVM requires few actual modifications to achieve the optimal
solution. While optimising adversarial examples towards other
classifiers tends to be more dynamic. More features within the
allowed range to achieve the optimum.
5) Evaluation results by manipulation strategy.: As pre-
sented in Section IV-B, two strategies can apply to the
proposed APK manipulation method. In simple manipulation
strategy, calls originated from any caller can be inserted into
the smali code; while in sophisticated manipulation strat-
egy, only API calls originated from self-defined or
obfuscated family/package can be added. Thus, we exam-
ine the feasibility of the sophisticated manipulation strategy,
by restricting that only the values of the calls originated from
self-defined/obfuscated can be modified in the feature space.
We craft both low-confidence and high-confidence adversarial
examples by setting the hyper-parameter κ in the algorithm as
0 and 100, respectively. Fig. 9 presents the evasion rates and
the corresponding average distortions. In the low-confidence
attack, the evasion rate are 22%, 18%, 29%, and 28%, in
RF, SVM, 1-NN, and 3-NN, respectively, with 50, 30, 24,
and 25 calls in average to be added. In the high-confidence
attack, 59%, 64%, 53%, 45% of the malware samples evade
the detection of the above mentioned classifiers, respectively.
The distortion of such attack is also high, with in average 2021,
281, 671, 824 API calls to be added to each malware sample.
However, we argue that since the process of code insertion is
automated, adding more number of API calls is a trivial task.
V. ATTACK ON DREBIN
A. Attack Algorithm
We adopt the Jacobian-based attack to craft an adversarial
example for Drebin, since the features of Drebin are binary.
JSMA perturbs a feature from 0 to 1, in each iteration.
Regarding the Jacobian for Drebin, we calculate it based on
the following formula:
JF (X) = [
∂F (X)
∂X
] = [
∂Fj(X)
∂xi
]i∈1...n,j∈0,1 (6)
wherein X is the binary feature vector for Drebin and i is
the classification result (i.e., malware if i = 1). Based on
the Jacobian matrix, we select the most influential feature to
perturb in each iteration. In other words, we perturb the i-th
feature for which i = arg maxi∈1...n,xi=0F0(xi). We change
the selected one feature from 0 to 1 in each iteration, until the
example is misclassified, or we reach the maximum amount
of allowed change (i.e., γ).
B. APK Manipulation
Drebin extracts features from both manifest and
dexcode. Different from previous work that only modifies
the features in manifest [20], we analyse the capability of
modifying the features obtained from the dexcode.
As explained in Section III-B, Drebin retrieves fea-
tures by applying a linear scan on related source files
10
0 20 40 60 80 100
#  Upper Bound of Modification
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ev
as
io
n 
Ra
te
RF
SVM
1-NN
3-NN
(a) evasion rate
0 20 40 60 80 100
# Upper Bound of Modification
0
5
10
15
20
25
# 
Ac
tu
al
 M
od
ifi
ca
tio
n
RF
SVM
1-NN
3-NN
(b) actual modification
Fig. 8. Different upper bound of modification in the family mode by JSMA; (a) for evasion rate, and (b) for actual modification
(AndroidManifest.xml and smali files), which only
searches for the presence of particular strings (e.g., name
of API calls), rather than examining whether the calls are
executed. Therefore, our strategy is to add code containing
the required features but never being invoked or executed. The
listing below presents an example of adding a “suspicious
API: getSystemService()” feature to the smali code.
.method private addSuspiciousApiFeature()V
.locals 1
const-string v0, "phone"
.line 17
invoke-virtual {p0, v0},
La/test/com/myapp/MainActivity;->
getSystemService(Ljava/lang/String;)
Ljava/lang/Object;
move-result-object v0
check-cast v0,
Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;
return-void
.end method
C. Experiments & Evaluations
We present our attack performance on Drebin by reporting
the evasion rate and the average distortion in different real
world scenarios. The evasion rate is defined as the ratio
of malware samples that are misclassified as benign, to the
total number of malware samples in the testing set. Aver-
age distortion is defined as the average number of code
blocks added to the classes.dex for each malware sample.
Dataset described in Section IV-C is used in the experiments.
Fig. 10 reports the result of our proposed attack. In scenario
FTB, where the adversary gets most knowledge of Drebin
(i.e., the feature set, the training set, and black-box access),
99% of malware samples in the testing set are misclassified
after the attack, with average 3.5 features to be added in
each sample. While in scenario F, where the adversary obtains
least knowledge of Drebin (i.e., only the feature set), 60%
adversarial malware examples can evade from detection.
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Fig. 9. Results of applying sophisticated manipulation strategy in the family
mode by C&W, in Low-confidence (κ=0) and High-confidence (κ=100)
Table V presents the average number of features inserted
into each malware sample, from which we observe that the
most added features are in the sets of restricted API calls and
suspicious API calls.
TABLE V. NUMBER OF FEATURES ADDED IN EACH SET
source file feature sets avg. number added
dexcode
S5 Restricted API calls 2.17
S6 Used permissions 0.1
S7 Suspicious API calls 1.21
S8 Network addresses 0.02
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Why We Are Successful
A critical challenge in crafting adversarial malware ex-
amples is how to map the perturbed feature space into the
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Fig. 10. The average distortion and evasion rate of adversarial example
generated by JSMA on Drebin.
problem space. In other words, the challenge is to modify
APK in a way that the desired features are reflected while
the code functionality remains the same. Adding a specific
API call into an application’s call graph without affecting its
original functionality is a non-trivial task. In this paper, instead
of explicitly matching the API calls, MaMaDroid makes use of
their abstractions to realise the feature reflection. While using
the abstracted API may be more resilient to API changes and
the size of feature set stays manageable, the above challenge
can be solved.
We summarise the reasons as follows. First, as described in
Section IV-B, both of our proposed strategies can successfully
apply the perturbed features into the application’s smali code,
and further recompile the manipulated code into an APK.
Second, similar treatments can be applied on Drebin, as
described in Section V-B. This is one of the key reasons that
lead the proposed method to success. In addition, there are
also some other aspects. For example, by taking the advantage
of transferability of adversarial examples on various machine
learning models, we train a substitute model to approximate the
target detector. The optimal perturbations on the feature space
can then be calculated. We have carried out and presented more
empirical studies as shown in Section VI-B.
B. Transferability
The proposed attack framework is inspired by the trans-
ferability of adversarial examples among different machine
learning models. In previous works, it has been demonstrated
that adversarial examples crafted for one model may also be
misclassified by another model [40][27]. We further investigate
the limitation of tranferability by varying the number of
features that are allowed to be modified in the attack.
We conducted the experiments under the assumption that
the adversary can only modify a subset of the feature set S.
However, we limited the adversary to two subsets denoted
as S1 and S2. In our settings, S1 consisted of 104 features
indicating the presence of system-provided permissions in the
manifest (e.g., android.permission.SEND SMS), while S2 had
S (104 features) S (1450 features)
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Fig. 11. Empirical study of transferability on different number of modifiable
features, where S1 includes the system-provided permissions, and S2 includes
both system-provided and user defined permissions.
1,450 features, which included system permissions as well
as custom permissions defined by the application developer
(e.g., com.a.b.permission.DEADLY ACTIVITY). S was used
to train the original Drebin system and the substitute model,
while only S1 and S2 were allowed to be modified, of course
separately in the tests.
Fig. 11 compares the two cases of modifying S1 and S2
when crafting the adversarial example. While the evasion rate
on the substitute model was high in both cases (91% in S1 and
97.7% in S2), the transferabilities to SVM were quite different.
More specifically, the evasion rate slightly decreased from
97.7% to 74% when S2 was modified, indicating that a large
portion of the adversarial examples generated on the substitute
model were also misclassified by Drebin. However, the evasion
rate reduced dramatically from 91% to 9% if only S1 was
touched, showing that only a small portion of the adversarial
examples were effective on Drebin. This observation shows
that the number of modifiable features has a significant impact
on the transferability between models.
C. Side Effect of Our Attack
It could be argued that adding such number of dummy calls
or no-op APIs may make the application look suspicious. To
investigate whether our attack will introduce ‘side effect’ to the
original APK, we applied our attack algorithm on the benign
applications, where the target of the attack could be changed
to misclassify the benign applications as malware. According
to the experiment results, around 20% of the applications
were misclassified as malware, while the remaining 80% were
still recognised as benign applications after we have applied
the perturbations on those benign ones.. This observation, to
some extent, indicated that our attack is “target-oriented”.
In other words, the perturbations will have more impacts
on the malware classification while have slight influence on
misleading the classifiers with benign applications.
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D. Defence Methods
1) White-list filtering: Filtering out the API calls that
are not in a standard Android SDK when processing API
abstraction can effectively defence most of the camouflage API
calls we designed in simple manipulation strategy. However,
we have several ways to counter this defence method. Firstly, it
is difficult to filter out all camouflage APIs as well as includ-
ing all legitimate ones. For instance, some of the legitimate
packages (such as com.google.firebase) are not incorporated
in Android SDK, whose source code therefore are included in
the application’s project, which can be edited by the adversary.
Thus creating and invoking a non operational method in the
package com.google.firebase will alter the call graph,
but will not be filtered out by the white-list.
2) Ensemble learning method: Ensemble of classifiers is
one of the effective defences for black-box adversarial exam-
ple. A number of classifiers are trained with either a subset of
features, or a subset of training samples. The final classification
result is made based on the decision of different classifiers
(e.g., a majority voting). Therefore, to break ensemble defence,
an adversarial example must works for most of the classifiers.
However, in our C&W attack, we can adjust the attack
confidence to let the adversarial example move further in the
feature space, until it is moved across the decision boundaries
of all the classifiers. Another way to bypass ensemble defence
is to optimise an adversarial example over the expectation
of multiple sub-classifiers. However, this way of bypassing
ensemble defence is time consuming and computational-heavy.
VII. RELATED WORKS
A. Adversarial Attacks to Malware Detection
Recently, there are some research works that studied the
security aspect of various machine learning based malware
detectors. We give them a brief overview as follows:
Srndic et al. [25] proposed an attack against PDFRrate,
an online malicious PDF file detection system. They modified
the fields in PDF file that was not rendered by PDF readers.
They are extracted as features to discriminate malicious files
from benign ones. Similar work was done by Biggio et al.
[6], who leveraged gradient descent attack to evade detection.
Due to the relative simplicity of the PDF file structure, it is
easy to alter the file without changing the original content.
Rosenberg et al. [37] proposed a black-box attack against
machine learning based malware detectors in Windows OS
based on analysing API calls. The attack algorithm iteratively
added no-op system calls (which are extracted from benign
softwares) to the binary code. The proposed method could
only be applied to the detection systems that embedded the call
sequence into a feature vector. It could not work if the features
are statistical information extracted from the call sequence,
such as similarity score or probability. Grosse et al. [20]
extended an existing adversarial example crafting algorithm to
the Android domain. They trained a deep feed-forward neural
network classifier with the feature set adopted in Drebin. It
had a comparable detection performance with Drebin. Then,
they launched a white-box attack on the DNN model. In our
work, we further customised the algorithm they proposed, and
demonstrated a successful black-box attack on the original
Drebin system. Chen et al. [10] proposed a poisoning attack
for Android malware detection systems through polluting the
training set of the original detectors. However, to inject tainted
samples into the training set is an arguable assumption in
real world scenarios. Hu et al. [21] demonstrated a generative
adversarial network-based (GAN) approach to craft adversarial
examples of malware.
In additions, the works [20], [10], [21] used binary features
to indicate the presence of a certain permission or API.
The modification on these features usually cannot affect the
functionality of the applications. For instance, the adversary
can request a new permission in the manifest but will not
implement it in the code. Most of recent works will adopt
semantic features such as the ones extracted from the control
flow graphs. They usually require more cautions to tamper with
if we want the application functionality not to be affected.
B. Adversarial Example Crafting
Adversarial examples for DNN models were initially stud-
ied in computer vision systems. Szegedy et al. firstly used L-
BFGS to craft adversarial images for image classifiers [40]. As
a result, the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) was proposed to
rapidly craft adversarial examples through taking only a single
step in gradients updating. [19]. Basic iterative method (BIM)
improved FGSM into something that iteratively updated the
features by a fixed value based on the adversarial gradients
[23]. Alternatively, JSMA was proposed to craft adversarial
examples using the forward derivatives rather than back prop-
agating adversarial gradients [34]. Deepfool relied on local
linearities of neural networks to find adversarial examples with
minimal perturbations [31]. To craft high-confidence adversar-
ial examples, C&W introduced a special objective function to
tune the confidence value for the generated examples [8].
Adversarial examples of physical objects were also devel-
oped to fool object detectors [28], [7], [2]. The adversarial
physical object was made through expectation over transfor-
mation (EoT) [2]. An adversarial example is optimised based
on a set of transformation functions given a raw example. The
constraint for optimisation is the expectation of the distortion
over the examples generated with different transformation
functions.
Apart from the adversarial examples in computer vision
systems, adversarial examples have also been studied for
sequential data (e.g., text data). Papernot et al. adopted JSMA
to perturb Amazon review and change sentimental analysis
results [35]. Later on, two methods, namely ADDSENT and
ADDANY, were proposed to craft adversarial examples for
reading comprehension systems [22]. Quite recently, Hotflip
appeared as a gradient-based method to perturb text at either
character or word level. [14].
C. Android Malware Detection
Researchers have developed many Android malware detec-
tion methods in the last decade. So far, there are a few survey
published in this field. Readers could refer to these surveys
for typical methods [17], [39], [24]. In this subsection, we
mainly focus on those which were published recently and used
machine learning techniques as their core algorithms.
In this field, almost all recently proposed detectors relied on
semantic features to model malware behaviours. For example,
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Fan et al. [15] proposed DAPASA, an approach to detect
Android piggybacked applications through sensitive subgraph
analysis. Xu et al. [46] leveraged the inter-component com-
munication patterns to detect Android malware. Yang et al.
[47] developed DroidMiner to scan suspicious applications to
determine when they contain malicious modalities. DroidMiner
can also be used to diagnose the malware family. Similar idea
has also been developed by Li et al. in the work [26]. Du
et al. adopted community structures of weighted function call
graphs to detect Android malware. Zhang et al. [51] proposed
a semantic-based approach to classify Android malware via
dependency graphs. Gascon et al. [18] developed a method
based on efficient embeddings of function call graphs with an
explicit feature map. Furthermore, Yang et al. [48] considered
user-event-driven components and the related sequences of
callbacks from the Android framework to the application
code. They further developed a program representation to
capture those callback sequences so as to differentiate Android
malware from benign applications.
As explained in Section I, existing works [9], [20], [10],
[11], [49] will not work properly when recent detectors relied
more on semantic features. In this paper, we presented an
advanced method of crafting adversarial examples by applying
perturbations directly on the APK classes.dex file. The
generated adversarial examples will also be effective on recent
detectors that rely more on semantic features.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Recent studies in adversarial machine learning and com-
puter security have shown that, due to its weakness in battling
against adversarial examples, machine learning could be a
potential weak point of a security system [5], [4], [45]. This
vulnerability may further result in the compromise of the
overall security system. The underlying reason is that machine
learning techniques are not originally designed to cope with
intelligent and adaptive adversaries, who can manipulate input
data to mislead the learning system.
The goal of this work has been, more specifically, to show
that adversarial examples can be very effective to Android
malware detectors. To this end, we first introduced a DNN
based substitute model to calculate optimal perturbations that
also comply with the APK feature interdependence. We next
developed an automated tool to implement the perturbations
onto the source files (e.g., smali code) of a targeted malware
sample. According to the evaluation results, the Android
malware detection rates decreased from 96% to 1% in Ma-
MaDroid (i.e., a typical detector that uses semantic features).
We also tested Drebin (i.e., a typical detector that uses syntactic
features but also collects some features from classes.dex).
We found Drebin’s detection rates decreased from 97% to
1%. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
one to overcome the challenge of targeting recent Android
malware detectors, which mainly collect semantic features
from APK’s ‘classes.dex’ rather than syntactic features
from ‘AndroidManifest.xml’.
Our future work will focus on two areas: defence mecha-
nisms against such attacks and attack modifications to cope
with such mechanisms. For this paper, we only present in
Section VI-D a brief discussion about the feasibility of a white-
list filtering and an ensemble defence method. We further
explored the countermeasures to those potential defending
schemes. In the next stage, we plan to continue the in depth
analysis of various defence mechanisms. We can divide future
work into two subgroups: 1) detection of adversarial examples,
and 2) making the detectors resistant to adversarial attacks.
We will also compare between the effectiveness of different
substitute models’ architectures.
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